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This paper investigates the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure
quantity, quality, and external validation concerning assurance on capital constraints.
We examine if these disclosure characteristics matter to the investors in the financial
market, then they should be positively evaluated by financial market participants.
More specifically, we study the effects of disclosure quantity, quality, and assurance
on the access to financial resources for reporting firms. Analysis of data of an interna-
tional sample for the period of 2007–2016 significantly supports the value relevance
idea of CSR disclosure quality. We document that availability of more information
about the firm's CSR initiatives eases the financial access. Furthermore, the quality
and external assurance of CSR disclosure further strengthen the relationship between
disclosure and access to finance. Our paper not only provides support for buying
assurance but also argue for better assurance quality.
KEYWORDS
access to finance, assurance quality, capital constraints, corporate social responsibility report,
external assurance1 | INTRODUCTION
Contemporary debate on sustainable corporate development among
academics, consultants, and corporate executive has resulted in greater
corporate social responsibility (CSR) awareness. This poses emerging
challenges for firms to do their business in a more humane, ethical, and
responsible way. At the same time, communicating CSR efforts success-
fully to stakeholders is another challenge for themanagers (Adams, Potter,
Singh, & York, 2016; Qiu, Shaukat, & Tharyan, 2016). Corporate reporting
efforts are costly and time‐consuming; however, managers are often
unsure if the reports achieve the desired information provision goals. If
the information serves stakeholders' needs and offers useful bases for
investment decisions, then it should have a relevant effect of a firm's mar-
ket value (Brooks & Oikonomou, 2018; Li, Gong, Zhang, & Koh, 2018).- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
e Creative Commons Attribution Li
y and Environmental ManagementDespite great scholarly attention towards the value relevance
issue in various fields of business research, the results are still inconclu-
sive (Baboukardos, 2018; Cahan, De Villiers, Jeter, Naiker, & Van
Staden, 2016; Clarkson, Fang, Li, & Richardson, 2013). The empirical
literature is unable to achieve consensus about the economic conse-
quences of CSR‐related disclosure (Hussain, Rigoni, & Cavezzali,
2018). Recently, researchers like Cohen and Simnett (2014) highlighted
the need for further research in the field of assurance of CSR reports
because of the lack of credibility and reliability of these reports.
To take a step farther for consensus building, this paper aims to
investigate the value relevance of sustainability disclosure concerning
its quantity, quality, and external validation in terms of assurance by
examining their effects on capital constraints. The paper deals with
two related research questions: (1) Does sustainability information- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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quality of sustainability disclosure and external assurance further
strengthen the relationship between disclosure and access to finance?
Recently, corporations face amplified pressures from numerous
stakeholders to be ethical and transparent (Elias, 2004). For this rea-
son, stakeholders expect corporations to disclose financial and nonfi-
nancial information about a firm's strategies and operations (Cormier
& Magnan, 2014; Haque, 2017). The traditional practices of preparing
financial reports have failed to fully inform the stakeholders (Bernardi
& Stark, 2018). This has shifted managers' attention toward new ways
of reporting. As a result, many financial reports now contain CSR per-
formance information (Galbreath, 2011; Rupley, Brown, & Marshall,
2012). Majority of large firms have started issuing standalone sustain-
ability reports (KPMG, 2011). These reports are costly to prepare, yet
managers are often unsure if reports achieve the desired goals of
information dissemination (O'Dwyer, 2002). This managerial, as well
as academic skepticism, has led academic scholarship to study the
value relevance, the benefits, of CSR reporting in detail during the last
couple of decades (see for review, Wang, Dou, & Jia, 2016).
Despite significant scholarly efforts to investigate the usefulness
of CSR disclosure, the disagreement prevails about whether and how
CSR disclosure influences stakeholders' perception (Luo, Wang,
Raithel, & Zheng, 2015) and firm value (Baboukardos, 2018). Some
argue that disclosure quantity leads to more informed investment
decision (Dugar & Nathan, 1995; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015), whereas
others consider quality as the main factor for the impact of CSR disclo-
sure on corporate value (Gao, Dong, Ni, & Fu, 2016). This tension not
only exists regarding quality and quantity but also about firm's initia-
tive to whether disclose such information or not (Cahan et al., 2016).
For instance, Wang and Tuttle (2014) and Liesen, Figge, Hoepner,
and Patten (2017) are of the view that CSR is important for building
a firm's reputation in the financial market. On the other hand, Palmer,
Oates, and Portney (1995) consider CSR reporting as an additional
cost with no benefits. In this paper, we try to resolve this tension by
studying the link of both quantity and quality dimensions of CSR dis-
closure with financial consequences for reporting firms.
From a pure economic perspective, full disclosure helps firms
increase information symmetry (Martínez‐Ferrero, Ruiz‐Cano, &
García‐Sánchez, 2016), which escalates awareness about a company's
existence in the financial market and its investor base (Merton, 1987).
At the same time, superior quality disclosure eases operating cash
flows (Lambert, Leuz, & Verrecchia, 2007; Lourenço, Callen, Branco,
& Curto, 2014) and lowers financing cost (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang,
2014). Despite these anecdotal shreds of evidence and availability of
sustainability information from credible sources, for example, KLD,
Bloomberg, and Thomson Reuter's ASSET4, it is not yet clear that
how the general investors use this information. Furthermore, such
information is not easily understandable by general investors (Luo
et al., 2015). Hence, investors are greatly dependent on experts—that
is, financial analysts and external monitoring agencies—to interpret the
complex CSR information (Dugar & Nathan, 1995).
Despite the continuous production of CSR reports, no empirical
investigation fully supports that investors directly rely on CSR infor-
mation for making their investment decisions (Hodge, Subramaniam,
& Stewart, 2009). The basic reason for this lack of confidence couldbe the absence of credibility mechanisms (Brown‐Liburd & Zamora,
2014). This lack of investors' confidence furnishes an economic ratio-
nale for a firm to purchase assurance for its CSR/sustainability report
(Simnett, Vanstraelen, & Chua, 2009). In this sense, the assurance is
more and more likely to materialize the link between CSR information
and shareholder confidence. Although Hodge et al. (2009) acknowl-
edge some limitations associated with the CSR assurance process,
there is no availability of generally accepted assurance standards and
there is a wide heterogeneity of professional services in the assurance
market. Both limitations lead to variations in the type of assurance
that resultantly cause uncertainty concerning its quality.
Keeping in view these confusions regarding the value relevance of
CSR disclosure quantity, quality, external assurance, and assurance
quality, this paper tries to uncover some important aspects about
the links between CSR disclosure and financial market reaction by
bundling and testing the effects of various characteristics of such dis-
closure on firm's access to finance. This bundling approach helps us
shed light on important aspects of value relevance of CSR reporting.
Using 9,744 firm‐year observations from 24 different countries and
for 10 years, we explore these relationships by employing state‐of‐
the‐art generalized method of moments (GMMs). Our results provide
strong and robust support for a positive effect of quantity, quality,
availability, and quality of external assurance on access to finance.
We find strong complementarities between various characteristics of
CSR disclosure while affecting access to a firm to financial resources.
Our results have several implications for managers and future
researchers. First, the results can help boost the confidence of man-
agers on CSR disclosure and assurance. With these practices, manage-
rial decisions not only generate benefits for society and improve
corporate transparency but also reduce capital constraints for reporting
firms. Second, for firms, it in their great interest to know the clear ben-
efits of reporting CSR information with better quality and external
assurance. Our results support that the benefits that can be accrued
for a firm by higher quality CSR information disclosure are greater than
lower quality reporting. Finally, we must be aware of the fact that CSR
disclosure is still voluntary in many countries; the assurance market,
moreover, is an unregulated market. For these reasons, our results offer
interesting insights for policymakers and regulatory bodies, as well as
governments. More specifically, the governments and market regula-
tory actors can help financial market to be efficient by promoting qual-
ity aspects of CSR disclosure in an economy.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section is devoted to
the discussion of prior literature and the development of hypotheses.
In section 3 we describe our methodology, data, and the analytical
strategy. In section 4, we present the empirical findings and discuss
the results. In the last section, we provide conclusions, implications,
and future research directions.2 | THEORETICAL LENS, LITERATURE
REVIEW, AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The use of theoretical frameworks in exiting research around CSR is
very inconstant. In the given research vein, Ioannou and Serafeim
(2015) and Luo et al. (2015) use stakeholder theory, Cormier and
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agency and stakeholder framework, Lourenço et al. (2014) use signal-
ing theory and resource‐based theory, Cho, Lee, and Pfeiffer (2013)
follow information efficiency theory, and Aerts, Cormier, and Magnan
(2008) take support from institutional theory. A careful review of
extant literature reveals that stakeholder theory is the dominant theo-
retical perspective to provide the rationale for our research question.
Therefore, we use the lens of stakeholder theory to provide novel
empirical evidence about the value relevance of CSR reporting extrap-
olated to access to finance.
In line with the stream of literature about the topic, the delinea-
tion provided by Carroll (1979) shows that CSR, by definition, should
not be related to financial performance. Although on the other hand,
Freeman (1984) suggests that firms should consider not only the profit
maximization goals but also the goals of a wider variety of stake-
holders. In this sense, if the firm takes care of the wider variety of
stakeholders, then it can achieve above‐average financial performance
goals (Flammer, 2013). This implies that stakeholders are important for
the survival of a corporation. Research dealing with stakeholder
engagement in strategic corporate decision‐making issues greatly sup-
ports this fact (Henisz, Dorobantu, & Nartey, 2014). Furthermore, in
CSR and financial performance nexus research the stakeholder theory
has been proposed as a dominant theory in many ways (for a review,
see; Agle et al., 2008).
Particularly, Jones (1995) proposed instrumental stakeholder the-
ory according to which CSR is a corporate instrument that firms use
to obtain resources or support from stakeholders. Research in this
domain show that stakeholder theory can be divided into two main
branches—ethical and managerial (Barako & Brown, 2008). Deegan
(2013) and O'Dwyer (2002) named ethical as a normative stakeholder
theory and managerial positive stakeholder theory. Normative and pos-
itive are “mutually supportive” branches of stakeholder theory, and
these branches support transparent and conflict‐free management‐
stakeholder relationship (Donaldson& Preston, 1995, p.6). In this sense,
stakeholder theory provides better rationale for the nonfinancial disclo-
sure with financial performance. We use the original premise of stake-
holder theory that contends that the firm should meet not only
stockholder needs but also those of stakeholders concerning providing
high‐quality financial and nonfinancial information. Moreover, the
stakeholder theory also provides a rationale for linking the nonfinancial
disclosure characteristics with financial constraints as the theory posits
that firms that care for stakeholders have better survival chances in the
financial market (Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014).
We built upon existing knowledge on CSR reporting from several
perspectives. From strategic management perspective, Sharfman and
Fernando (2008), Cheng et al. (2014), and Luo et al. (2015) argue that
CSR information is value relevant and the financial market participants
use this information to develop their perception about the focal com-
pany. Similarly, Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, and Yang (2012) and
Bernardi and Stark (2018) from the field of accounting and Hartojo
and Jo (2015) from a business ethics perspective argue that firms that
provide CSR disclosure receive more attention from the security ana-
lysts and resultantly are more attractive for the investors.
More specifically, Sharfman and Fernando (2008) note that envi-
ronmental disclosure negatively affects cost of capital. Luo et al.(2015) provide qualitative and quantitative evidence about a positive
relationship between CSR disclosure and share performance. Likewise,
from the accounting perspective, Dhaliwal et al. (2012) and Bernardi
and Stark (2018) note better analysts' forecast accuracy in the pres-
ence of CSR information. Similarly, Hartojo and Jo (2015) note a sig-
nificant negative impact of CSR information on forecast error. Most
of these studies argue that firms that are careful about their negative
effects of operation on economy, physical environment, and society
are more attractive for the financial market participants. In this sense,
firms can strategically use the CSR activities to display their care about
wider variety of stakeholders better and send a positive signal in the
financial market.
Although by definition, CSR is not related to financial perfor-
mance, in literature this relationship has been studied in great detail
(see, e.g., Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Brooks & Oikonomou, 2018;
Hussain et al., 2018). Yet the consensus regarding the nature of the
relationship is missing. This lack of consensus calls for further
research. Therefore, we focus on quality as well as the quantity of
CSR information in relation to financial constraints. The study of
financial constraints is important because it involves frictions in the
capital market that can prevent a company from undertaking invest-
ment projects due to a scarcity of the necessary financing. This
inability to obtain the necessary financing may be due to various
other reasons including credit limitations or inability to obtain
loans, failure to meet financial market expectations, or liquidity
issues due to excessive dependence on bank loans (Lamont, Polk, &
Saaá‐Requejo, 2001).
Moreover, when determining the conditions of a debt contract,
the lender uses all available information to assess the borrower's abil-
ity to meet future payment obligations arising from the operation and
the potential risks that the company may have. In this sense, the
impact that corporate information has in the determination of the con-
ditions agreed upon in credit operations has stimulated research on
the relationship between the disclosure, its quality, and the cost of
using debt in the capital structure (Goss & Roberts, 2011).
This research stream advances the premise of debt covenant
hypothesis: lenders often introduce clauses in debt contracts (debt
covenants); these covenants consider that the interest rate supported
by the company is linked to the time evolution of certain indicators
calculated from their accounting figures, such as profitability and sol-
vency ratios. Recently, CSR has become one of the important indica-
tors of business performance (Wang & Bansal, 2012). Additionally,
when determining the conditions of a debt contract, the lender uses
all available information to assess the borrower's ability to meet future
payment obligations arising from the operation and the potential risks
the company may suffer.
In this sense, efficient capital market hypothesis and positive
accounting theory support stakeholder theory and posit that more dis-
closure reduces information asymmetry and improve capital market
efficiency (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Yet a critical strand of CSR litera-
ture about the usefulness of CSR reporting is fragmented. In this
respect, Aerts et al. (2008) provide novel empirical evidence
supporting the utility argument of sustainability disclosure. They argue
that such disclosure is important for the financial market participants.
Similarly, Kim, Li, and Li (2014) argue that it is necessary to bear in
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decreasing the information risk of uninformed investors.
Despite the theoretical support for CSR disclosure, the controversy
regarding the usefulness of such disclosure exists in the recent litera-
ture. In this respect, Cormier and Magnan (2014) note that CSR disclo-
sure improves analysts' following and reduces forecast dispersion.
Similarly, Dhaliwal et al. (2012) and Ioannou and Serafeim (2015) among
many others find that analysts heed CSR information in preparing their
recommendations. On the other hand, Campbell and Slack (2011) docu-
ment that sustainability information is not useful for sell‐side security
analysts. Similarly, the literature on the use of CSR information by inves-
tors is also fragmented. Recently, Flammer (2013) find that investors
pay more for the stock of socially responsible firms, whereas Orlitzky
(2013) argues that CSR information disclosure creates noise and
increases information asymmetry. More recently, Hawn, Chatterji, and
Mitchell (2018) show that CSR performance is not important for inves-
tors. However, Cheng et al. (2014) document that firms, which disclose
more CSR information, face fewer difficulties in accessing finances and
vice versa.
Overall, the role of the quantity of CSR information has beenwidely
studied in the existing investment literature (Dhaliwal et al., 2012, 2014)
yet the usefulness of the sustainability information for financial market
participants is an open‐ended empirical research question, which
deserves further attention (Jo & Harjoto, 2014). In general, most of
the existing investigations support that disclosing CSR reporting is a
value‐enhancing corporate strategy. Existing evidence also supports
that ensuring a higher quality of information could even result in a better
investors´ valuation of CSR disclosure (Hooks & van Staden, 2011).
Although these pieces of evidence from various literature strands,
very little has been researched about the value relevance of CSR
assurance. Firms are spending a huge chunk of their already scarce
financial resources on purchasing external assurance for CSR reports.
By providing assurance, corporations show a real commitment
towards sustainability, as well as they try to improve credibility and
consistency of the environmental and social disclosure for stake-
holders (Hodge et al., 2009; O'Dwyer & Owen, 2005). By enhancing
transparency, firms try reducing the information asymmetry and
uncertainty associated with corporate disclosure (Moroney, Windsor,
& Aw, 2012; Perego & Kolk, 2012). Yet what value this adds regarding
the incremental positive effect on the bottom line is an underexplored
research avenue. Dhaliwal et al. (2012) and Brown‐Liburd and Zamora
(2014) argue that assured CSR/sustainability reports are more trust-
worthy for investors.
Similarly, Simnett et al. (2009) note that assurance can help
reduce the skepticism of the CSR information users and win legitimacy
for the firm. Similarly, Mock, Strohm, and Swartz (2007) and Perego
and Kolk (2012) argue that external assurance for CSR reports legiti-
mizes the firms' claims about corporate sustainability. But, the above
studies do not use holistic approach towards various characteristics
of CSR disclosure and their relationship with market reaction.
Reporting more and better quality CSR information as well as get-
ting it externally assured reinforces the credibility and improves confi-
dence and perception of information users (Pflugrath, Roebuck, &
Simnett, 2011). The trust generated by the corporate transparency
advances understanding of the risks for investors and creditors thusreduces the cost of the debt for reporting firms (Martínez‐Ferrero &
García‐Sánchez, 2017). Furthermore, enhanced investor confidence
may help firms improve their access to financial resources (Cheng
et al., 2014).
However, the existence of heterogeneous professional services in
the assurance market and the lack of generally accepted standards of
assurance indicate that there can be a substantial variation in the main
elements of an assurance process including objectives, procedures,
scope, and assurance report contents (Hodge et al., 2009). This situation
creates doubts about the quality of the assurance. Unlike the financial
auditor opinion, assurance is not determined by the opinion issued but
by the quality indicators of the report issued. A careful review of the lit-
erature shows that very little has been researched on this issue.
Furthermore, how the capital market reacts to assurance quality is
still unknown in the existing literature. Despite the lack of previous
studies in this vein and based upon the stakeholder theory, we expect
that financial market positively reacts to a higher quality of assurance.
We expect that higher assurance quality achieves better access to
finance because in those firms that provides a greater quality external
assurance for their nonfinancial reports. For the financial market, the
assurance process in itself could be the factor that increases the cred-
ibility of the CSR information, not its quality. At least in part, it could
be a result of the multiple options of practitioners, levels, criteria, pro-
cedures, and opinions concerning assurance.
Overall, we keep in view the theoretical assertions of stakeholder
theory, as well as an efficient market hypothesis, positive accounting
theory perspective, and abundant empirical support about the quality
of information and its usefulness to develop our hypotheses. We
believe that providing higher quality CSR information—disclosure and
assurance—leads to better access to financial resources. In other
words, our research hypotheses contend that CSR disclosure can ease
the financial access for firms. Furthermore, this positive relationship
can be reinforced if this CSR disclosure is accompanied by better qual-
ity and external assurance. Therefore, we hypothesize following
relationships:Hypothesis 1. Higher amount of CSR disclosure posi-
tively impacts access to financial resources.
Hypothesis 2. Higher quality of CSR disclosure posi-
tively impacts access to financial resources.
Hypothesis 3. External assurance of CSR reports further
strengthens the positive impact of CSR disclosure on
access to financial resources.
Hypothesis 4. Higher assurance quality of CSR reports
further strengthens the positive impact of CRS disclosure
on access to financial resources.3 | DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 | Sample
We advocate that the prevailing disagreement in the literature can be
solved by using specific quality criteria for CSR disclosure. To
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the impact of quantity, quality, and reliability of CSR information on
access to finance. We collected the data from two different databases
for 10 years (i.e., 2007–2016). First, we gathered archival data from
Thomson Reuters EIKON for all firms from the global indices. This com-
prises 3,594 firms belonging to 31 stock indices. Then, we combine the
archival data with the CSR reporting information gathered from the
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) database. The GRI database contains
all centrally collected data points for reports published from 1999 until
the date for more than 6,000 companies worldwide.
For our first objective that is to examine the impact of CSR disclo-
sure, its quality, and reliability on access to financial resources we use
this public data. After dropping missing observations, our final bal-
anced sample contains 9,744 firm‐year observations from 1,137 firms.
Our sample is quite heterogeneous in terms of operations of sample
firms in different sectors as well as different countries. Table 2 pro-
vides a detailed description of our study sample concerning time
frame, industries, and countries.
Our second objective is to test whether the quality and reliability
of CSR information have a positive impact on access to finance. To
test the proposed effect, we chose only those companies that disclose
their CSR information in standalone CSR reports. However, some do
assure such information, whereas others do not. Thus, we removed
the firms from our initial sample data of 1,137 firms (9,744 observa-
tions) for which assurance data were not available during our selected
period. This resulted in 4,076 firm‐year observations from 829 firms
for the 24 countries and activity sectors.
3.2 | Models and analytical technique
The goal of this research is to examine how the CSR disclosure, its
quality, and reliability are value relevant for investors by affecting
reporting company's access to finances. To achieve this goal, we uti-
lized various regressions models following a sequential logic attending
to sample 1 (for hypotheses 1 to 3) and sample 2 (for hypothesis 4).
Using our initial sample, our model 1 examines the impact of the
existence of a CSR report on access to finance. After testing this rela-
tionship, in model 2, we analyze the effect of the quality of CSR disclo-
sures as well as the moderating role of assurance on the relationship
between CSR reporting quality and access to finance. Both models
are illustrated below:
KZ Indexit ¼ β1CSRDit þ β2Sizeit þ β3Leverageit
þ β4Market capit þ β5LTD CEit þ β6Lossit
þ β7Number Analystsit
þ β8Capital expendituresit þ ∑31k¼9βkIndustryk it
þ ∑55j¼32βjCountryj it þ ∑65t¼56βtYeart þ μit þ ηi; (Model1)
KZ Indexit ¼ φ1CSRD qualityit þ φ2Assuranceit
þ φ3CSRD quality*Assuranceit þ φ4Sizeit
þ φ5Leverageit þ φ6Market capit
þ φ7LTD CEit þ φ8Lossit
þ φ9Number Analystsit
þ φ10Capital expendituresit
þ ∑33k¼11φkIndustrykit þ ∑57j¼34φjCountryj it
þ ∑67t¼58φtYeart þ μit þ ηi: (Model2)To test the reinforcing role of assurance quality, we used our sec-
ond sample, that is, firms that disclose CSR information with assurance
data. We address the following question: Does the financial market
assess assurance or assurance quality? For this, model 3, represented
below, regresses the CSR reporting quality, assurance quality, and
the interaction between both on access to finance:
KZ Indexit ¼ γ1CSRD qualityit þ γ2AQit
þ γ3CSRD quality*AQit þ γ4Sizeit
þ γ5Leverageit þ γ6Market capit þ γ7LTD CEit
þ γ8Lossit þ γ9Number Analystsit
þ γ10Capital expendituresit
þ ∑33k¼11γkIndustryk it þ ∑57j¼34γjCountryjit
þ ∑67t¼58γtYeart þ μit þ ηi: (Model3)
All the above models include a firm‐specific effect (η) to control
for unobserved heterogeneity, whereas (μ) is the disturbance term. In
all models, (i) represents a firm and (t) refers to the time. (β, φ, and γ)
are the parameters to be estimated.
In all models, we use dependence techniques for panel data. Panel
data have better explanatory power than time series and cross‐
sectional data. More specifically, panel data analysis allows control
for unobserved heterogeneity, that is, characteristics of each company
that are time invariant. It also eliminates the bias of aggregation that is
common in time series analysis. Keeping in view the merits of panel
data analysis, we apply various regression models. We follow Arellano
and Bond (1991) and use the dynamic panel estimator. This estimator
is based on the GMMs. As a suitable instrument in our analytical
model, we use lagged values of the right‐hand side variables. The
major reason of the use of these instruments is their insignificant cor-
relation with the error term while deriving the estimator.
3.3 | Measurement of variables
3.3.1 | Access to finance: Capital constraints
Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997), we measure the KZ index as a
reverse measure of access to finance for every firm every year. This
measure is a result of a linear combination of five accounting ratios:
cash holding to total capital, cash flow to total capital, debt to total
capital, dividends to total capital, and market to book ratio. We calcu-
late the regression coefficients to construct the index. Besides, we fol-
low Cheng et al. (2014) to calculate the “KZ_Index” as follows:










In the above equation, “CF” represents cash flow, “A” represents
total assets, “DIV” represents the cash dividends paid by the company
in current year, “C” represents cash balances, “LEV” represents the
level of leverage in firm's capital structure, and “Q” represents the
market value of equity. From the above equation, the higher value
of the KZ index indicates more constraints a firm faces to access
finances.
TABLE 1 Categories of the quality of CSR disclosure variable
CSR_quality
values Type of CSR report
CSR_quality = 0 When company has not disclosed any CSR
information
CSR_quality = 25 When company discloses some CSR information
but report does not follow GRI guidelines.
CSR_quality = 50 When company follows GRI guidelines to disclose
CSR information. The level of application is C for
GARCÍA‐SÁNCHEZ ET AL. 8373.3.2 | CSR Disclosure
One of the main independent variables is CSR disclosure (“CSRD”).
Following Kolk and Perego (2010) and Gamerschlag, Möller, and
Verbeeten (2011), we operationalize CSRD as a dummy variable to
measure the availability of a firm's CSR, environmental, or sustainabil-
ity report. If a firm has issued a standalone report, it takes value 1 and
0 otherwise.reporting. That is, reports provided are very basic
information. The sustainability report includes
information on a minimum of any 10 indicators.
This disclosure should include at least one
indicator from each pillar: social, economic, and
environmental. The disclosed performance
indicators should have 7 out of the 10 from the
GRI guidelines.
CSR_quality = 75 Following the B level of the GRI guidelines firm
provides a complete report which contains
information on:
Profile disclosure, disclosures on management
approach, performance indicators, and sector
supplement performance indicators: a minimum of
any 20 performance indicators out of which 14
must be from the GRI guidelines.
CSR_quality = 100 Following the A level of the GRI guidelines firm
provides an advanced level report. More
specifically, the report is complete and follows all
indicators according to GRI guidelines.
Furthermore, this report follows comprehensive
approach.
Note. CSR. corporate social responsibility; GRI, Global Reporting Initiative.
Source: Cuadrado‐Ballesteros et al. (2015) and Martínez‐Ferrero et al.
(2016).3.3.3 | Quality of CSR disclosure
The remarkable increase in the attention of several stakeholders'
groups has led corporations to increase the volume and quality of
CSR disclosure, although no worldwide generally acceptable
sustainability‐reporting standard for compiling and presenting CSR
information is available. Some standard setters like GRI have started
facilitating this process through GRI guidelines. The data presented
in the sustainability report under such guidelines have been widely
used to assess the degree and quality of CSR disclosure (e.g.,
Cuadrado‐Ballesteros, Rodríguez‐Ariza, & García‐Sánchez, 2015;
Hussain, Rigoni, & Orij, 2018; Legendre & Coderre, 2012).
Following the convention, we also rely on the reports to
operationalize the independent variable, “CSRD_quality.”We gathered
sustainability reports from companies' websites and website of
corporateregister.com.1 In the second step of data gathering, for every
year, we review the CSR reports of every company in the sample. In
the third step, we compare the information against the recommenda-
tions of the G3, G3.1, and G4 guidelines. To do so, we first determined
the level of the application according to GRI guidelines to ensure that
our scoring is consistent with GRI standards. We further ranked C, B,
or A, according to the application of GRI standards. Level C represents
the lowest level of application of GRI standards in the standalone
report. Similarly, levels B and A reflect medium‐ and high‐quality
reports, respectively.
Table 1 presents the detail of the scoring process. We follow
Cuadrado‐Ballesteros et al. (2015) and many others for the scoring
procedure. In this process, we distinguish and assign a score for the
quantity of reporting data between reporting and nonreporting com-
panies in a specific year. We assign 0 point for nonreporter and 25
points for those companies that publish some information but whose
reports do not comply with the GRI guidelines. In the next step, we
read and assign a score to the reports that comply with GRI guidelines
with levels A, B, or C. We assign 50 points for level C reports, 75 points
for level B, and 100 points for level A application. Thus, the disclosure
level is measured on an ordinal scale values: 0, 25, 50, 75, or 100.
Furthermore, under recent G4 guidelines, there are two options to
prepare CSR/sustainability reports, that is, the core option and the
comprehensive option. Both these options aim at identifying material
aspects related to corporate sustainability engagement and are appli-
cable to all corporations regardless of their size, sector, or location.
These reflect the organization's economic, environmental, and social1Corporateregister.com is one of the biggest directories that collect full text sus-
tainability report of reporting companies across the globe.impacts. Furthermore, these aspects practically guide the decision‐
making process of major stakeholders.
We assign 75 points to the reports that are following G4 guide-
lines with the core option, whereas the companies that prepare
reports in accordance with G4 guidelines with the comprehensive
option have been given 100 points. The difference between the core
and the comprehensive option is clearly described in G4 guidelines.
Under the core option framework, firms are obliged to disclose infor-
mation about their core operations' related data in a qualitative and
quantitative form. The comprehensive option includes the core option
and requires additional standard disclosures. The additional disclosure
includes information regarding a firm's ethics and integrity, strategy
and analysis, and governance. Moreover, under this option, a compre-
hensive performance disclosure is demanded.3.3.4 | Assurance
As a measure of disclosure quality, we use the external assurance for a
standalone sustainability report. At each level of the above application,
a “plus” (+) sign is available (ex., C+, B+, and A+) if external assurance
was available for a given sustainability report for a specific year. In line
with Kolk and Perego (2010) and Zorio, García‐Benau, and Sierra
(2013), we operationalized assurance as a dummy variable “Assurance”
that takes value 1 when the external assurance was available and
0 otherwise.
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Visibility of the assurance engagement can only be generated through
the assurance statement. The empirical examination of the assurance
statement to understand the quality is one of the many approaches
in the CSR assurance literature (Gürtürk & Hahn, 2016; Perego & Kolk,
2012). Based on the evaluation framework by O'Dwyer and Owen
(2005), the content analysis is a useful way to evaluate the quality of
assurance reports.
Hence, based on the content analysis and the items in Table 2,
we create an index referred as “AQ.” The 12 items used are relevant
measures to understand the quality of assurance reports. This
approach is consistent with the assurance quality index suggestedTABLE 2 The quality of assurance reports, a context index
Ranking criteria Definition
1 Addressee Information about party to whom t
assurance statement formally ad
2 Assuror's Responsibilities Explicit statement that the reporter
is responsible to
express an opinion on the subjec
3 Assuror's Independence Statement expressing the independ
of all the involved parties.
4 Assurance engagement
Objective
Explicit objective to be achieved
through the engagement.
5 Assurance engagement scope Assurance statement coverage
6 Criteria A reference to particular criteria
against which the sustainability
report has been prepared.
7 Assurance standard(s) Following commonly used standard
are available to govern the work
of assuror: AA1000AS, IAE3000,
8 Work summary Explanation of the actions taken
to arrive at a conclusion
9 Materiality Degree of information provision
on materiality level.
10 Completeness All material aspects are covered
by the assurance report.
11 Responsiveness to
stakeholder
A clear statement that refers to
the firm's ways to identify
stakeholder interests and concer
12 General opinion Statement expressing the result
of the assurance exercise.
Note. Source: Martínez‐Ferrero et al. (2018)by O'Dwyer and Owen (2005) and Zorio et al. (2013). As defined
by common CSR reporting guidelines (see, AccountAbility, 2003GRI,
2006). These items set a minimum standard of a statement quality
(Perego & Kolk, 2012) and define assurance procedures, a reporting
format, opinions, and recommendations. We include these items
and the coding rules in Table 2. The score obtained from the content
analysis ranges from 0 to 23.
3.3.6 | Control variables
We also include many control variables to account for possible alterna-
tive explanations. We selected our controls after a careful review of
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Reference limited to a broad statement. Furthermore,
there is a mentioning that assuror has not confirm
that all material issues are included.
Reference and explanation of materiality setting or
reference limited to a broad statement and
stakeholder perspective introduced.
A clear Reference and explanation of materiality















A general remark or a statement stating the
opinion of the assurance provider
(e.g., “XY's report is a fair presentation of
XY's CSR performance”).
More detailed explanatory statement that includes
recommendations for improvement.
GARCÍA‐SÁNCHEZ ET AL. 8392014; Hartojo & Jo, 2015). Our main control variables included “Size”
measured as a measure of firm size and determined as the natural log-
arithm of total assets and “Leverage” measured as the total debt to
total equity ratio. We include these controls because the bigger firms
with less debt in the capital structure have more resources to invest
in nonprofit making activities (Hussain et al., 2018). Similarly, market
capitalization “Market_cap” and “LTD_CE” are included in the model.
We measure them as the market to book ratio and long‐term debt
divided by common equity respectively. We also include “Loss” that
takes value 1 if the firm reports negative earnings in a year and 0
otherwise. As an external governance mechanism, we include the
natural logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm through
a year represented as “Number_Analysts.” The data for this variable
were retrieved from I/B/E/S database. “Capital_expenditures” was
measured as the capital expenditure expense divided by total sales to
control for firms capital needs. Finally, to control for variation across
time “Year,” country “Country,” and industry “Industry,” we include
dummies.4 | RESULTS
4.1 | Descriptive analyses
In Table 3, we present the year‐wise, industry‐wise, and country‐
wise distribution of all variables, that is, CSR reporting, quality of
CSR disclosure, assurance, and assurance quality. We observe a
yearly increase in the proportion of firms that voluntarily report
CSR information as well as the quality of information and credibility
(by external assurance and its quality) of this disclosure. The distribu-
tion by activity sector indicates that “household and personal prod-
ucts” show the greater percentage of firms disclosing CSR reports,
with superior information quality and with a greater inclination to
assure them. However, concerning assurance quality, retailing and
telecommunications services are the industries with higher mean
values. Finland, Luxembourg, Italy, Mexico, and South Africa show
that the 100% of observations belong to firms that disclosure CSR
information. However, the quality of CSR reporting is higher in Fin-
land and Luxembourg. Italy shows the highest rate of external assur-
ance, but the higher quality values correspond to Finland, Singapore,
and Spain.
The correlation matrix and descriptive statistics of all variables are
presented in Table 4. The correlation coefficients only indicate low‐ or
moderate‐level associations between different constructs.4.2 | The impact on capital constraints of CSR
reporting: The quality of information and assurance
We now summarize the main results of our paper. Model 1 aims to
test how CSR reports easing the financial access for reporting compa-
nies, whereas Model 2 aims to examine how the quality of this volun-
tary reporting, as well as its external assurance, strengthens the
relation between disclosure and access to finance. Finally, Model 3
aims to analyze the impact of assurance quality.Table 5 shows the results of the impact of CSR information on
access to finance. In Model 1, CSRD is negative and significant in
explaining capital constraints (β1= − 0.081, p < 0.05). Moreover,
accounting for the elasticity value, that is, how an economic variable
responds to a change in another, we can infer a reduction of around
8.1% in capital constraints when a firm issues a standalone report.
Therefore, we support hypothesis 1 and confirm that the CSR disclo-
sure eases the financial access for reporting companies.
However, the value of this reporting is also conditioned on the qual-
ity and credibility of information disseminated. In Model 2,
“CSRD_quality” is negative and significant in explaining the access to
finance with better conditions (β1= − 0.004, p < 0.01). This supports
our hypothesis 2 that the higher quality of CSR reporting has a positive
and significant relationship with the access to financial resources. Given
the lack of credibility and user's confidence in the information of CSR,
whenwe examinewhether the impact of assurance statement amplifies
the previous relationships, we found an interesting result. On the one
hand, we acknowledge the need of accounting the effect of external
assurance. Model 2 also provides that “Assurance” negatively impacts
capital constraints (β2= − 0.196, p < 0.01). That means that the external
assurance ensures the credibility of CSR information and favors access
to finance with lower capital constraints. Furthermore, the test of the
complementary or substitutive relationship between both reveals that
the interaction term “CSRD_quality * Assurance” has a negative effect
on capital constraints (β3= − 0.005, p < 0.01). We then calculated the
coefficients that revealed that financial access is better for the superior
quality of CSR information. This effect is even higher when firms exter-
nally assured their reports (β1= − 0.004 + β3= − 0.005 = −0.009) than
when assurance is not available (β1= − 0.004).
When we examine the elasticity values of each indicator, the fol-
lowing can be inferred: First we observe a reduction of around 5% in
capital constraints when the information of CSR document is of higher
quality in terms of comparability and reliability. Secondly, we observe
a reduction of around 19% when firms assure their CSR statements.
Finally, we observe a reduction of 9% in capital constraints when the
higher quality is complemented by the assurance process (4% + 5%).
This confirms our third hypothesis that the external assurance of
CSR reporting further strengthens the relationship between the CSR
information quality and access to financial resources. The lower capital
constraints that arise from a higher information quality are even rein-
forced by the existence of an external process of assurance.
Finally, in Model 3 the “CSRD_quality” has a negative impact on
the access to finance with better conditions (γ1= − 1.53e−08,
p < 0.01). It also reveals that the “AQ” indicator negatively influences
capital constraints (γ2= − 5.08−e08, p < 0.01). The interaction indica-
tor “CSRD_quality * AQ” shows a negative effect on capital con-
straints (γ3= − 5.60e−10, p < 0.05). The calculation of the magnitude
reveals that the lower capital constraints as result of superior quality
of CSR information is even greater when assurance is of greater qual-
ity (γ1= − 1.53e−08 + γ3= − 5.60e−10 = −1.586e−08) than when the
quality of assurance is lower (γ1= − 1.53e−08).
However, we must be aware of the fact that coefficients are not
relevant in terms of their magnitude. Moreover, when we examine
the elasticity's values of each indicator, the insignificant effect regard-
ing the coefficient is again reported because the reduction in the
TABLE 3 Distribution of CSR report, quality and assurance, and attributes by year, sector, and country
CSRD CSRD_quality Assurance AQ
Freq. % Mean SD Freq. % Mean SD
Year
2007 222 34.63 14.59 26.48 103 16.07 12.169 5.537
2008 398 53.14 21.46 28.66 153 20.43 11.878 5.444
2009 475 54.54 2089 27.27 184 21.13 12.824 5.235
2010 565 59.41 21.74 26.10 222 23.34 12.084 5.312
2011 663 66.04 24.58 27.39 275 27.69 11.737 5.142
2012 714 68.00 25.31 27.32 319 30.38 12.464 4.997
2013 736 67.96 25.31 27.49 363 33.52 11.486 5.405
2014 763 67.82 25.00 27.01 389 34.58 11.975 5.169
2015 793 69.87 33.06 36.89 397 81.52 12.423 4.940




171 70.08 23.48 24.74 105 48.84 13.345 4.559
Capital goods 738 70.69 24.77 26.05 358 39.00 13.337 4.774
commercial and professional services 144 55.81 24.07 30.73 55 24.89 10.955 5.287
Consumer durables and apparel 201 62.62 20.37 23.81 101 36.07 11.138 5.449
Consumer services 175 51.17 22.03 31.90 58 20.57 6.879 4.021
Diversified financials 91 42.52 11.55 15.49 23 14.44 12.400 6.620
Energy 496 55.11 22.51 30.16 205 26.94 12.714 5.055
Food and stapples retailing 165 69.92 26.69 29.32 72 34.62 12.500 5.354
Food, beverage and tobacco 342 74.51 29.58 29.89 156 38.14 10.962 5.774
Health care equipment and services 183 42.86 12.91 21.14 39 11.11 11.600 5.758
Household and personal products 136 89.47 39.90 32.29 83 58.87 11.517 4.838
Insurance 13 30.95 7.32 11.52 0 0
Materials 836 69.38 30.11 32.78 386 36.52 11.778 4.888
Media 155 52.89 15.13 23.35 59 21.69 10.593 4.854
Pharmaceuticals,
biotechnology, and Life
254 71.35 29.55 30.22 145 45.17 12.962 4.481
Real estate 299 61.78 29.99 35.08 137 31.79 12.850 5.275
Retailing 180 40.45 13.86 24.03 65 18.11 14.086 4.997
Semiconductors and
semiconductors equipment
120 70.59 36.68 37.90 46 30.46 13.308 3.35
Software and services 182 40.72 15.69 26.03 51 13.86 10.545 5.535
Technology hardware
and equipment
227 74.18 29.07 30.03 120 44.61 11.956 4.487
Telecommunication services 233 76.39 39.55 36.83 155 54.20 14.177 4.511
Transportation 258 68.80 28.02 30.90 119 36.50 11.314 5.092
Utilities 529 77.45 30.53 30.54 272 44.44 13.342 5.488
Country
Australia 514 49.97 21.70 31.73 227 27.25 11.983 4.703
Belgium 9 90.00 60.00 42.82 7 70.00 12.667 5.774
Canada 545 36.50 14.88 27.13 124 12.34 13.105 4.411
China 166 45.36 13.95 21.28 27 9.93 11.556 5.411
Finland 4 100.00 62.50 43.30 3 75.00 16.333 0.557
France 267 91.13 37.15 30.49 228 78.35 14.902 3.330
Germany 197 94.26 50.49 35.26 134 65.69 14.143 5.063
Honh Kong 132 59.46 33.90 39.57 76 37.62 13.915 5.569
Ireland 74 67.89 24.76 26.74 34 34.34 13.722 4.456
Italy 20 100.00 32.50 23.08 20 100.00 12.000 6.403
Japan 883 93.64 33.45 26.46 553 65.68 11.505 5.545
(Continues)
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
CSRD CSRD_quality Assurance AQ
Freq. % Mean SD Freq. % Mean SD
Luxembourg 4 100.00 62.50 43.30 3 75.00 ‐ ‐
Mexico 8 100.00 25.00 0.00 3 37.50 ‐ ‐
Netherlands 150 89.29 37.05 29.84 115 71.88 9.833 4.462
New Zealand 18 40.91 7.43 11.58 0 0 ‐ ‐
Papua New Guinea 6 75.00 31.25 32.02 5 62.50 10.333 4.967
Russia 115 79.31 23.04 19.22 16 12.60 15.500 1.732
Singapore 125 64.43 29.92 33.70 37 21.14 16.8809 2.522
South Africa 130 100.00 37.89 27.15 62 50.41 11.667 5.489
Spain 163 96.45 42.71 30.75 14 85.89 16.400 4.840
Sweden 174 83.25 40.70 33.52 83 42.35 9.348 3.039
Switzerland 114 81.43 37.50 32.09 74 55.64 9.112 5.137
UK 563 84.92 28.38 24.56 353 57.49 14.216 5.159
USA 1,838 54.01 21.27 28.85 489 16.73 9.983 4.608
Note.
Sample 1: Companies that disclose and do not disclose corporate social responsibility (CSR) information: 9,744 observations of 1,137 companies in 2007–
2016.
Sample 2: Companies that disclose CSR information with assurance data: 4,076 observations of 829 companies in 2007–2016.
GARCÍA‐SÁNCHEZ ET AL. 841capital constraints never overcomes the value of 0.01%. Firms may
provide voluntary an assurance statement to increase transparency
and confidence and then to improve the access to finance. With it,
firms reinforce the value relevance of CSR reporting by ensuring its
reliability. However, investors and stakeholders do not have the skills
and knowledge about the specific assurance content: a lack of cogni-
tive and professional abilities that is reinforced with the wide diversity
existing around the assurance (criteria, processes, standards, assurers,
conclusions, and so on) and ends up preventing the external users pos-
itively value it. Therefore, despite our earlier result of the lower capital
constraints of higher quality and credibility of CSR information, evi-
dence cannot be obtained regarding assurance quality as we proposed
in our fourth hypothesis.4.3 | Robustness check
One of the potential limitations of this paper could be related to the
measurement of disclosure quality, which is based on content analysis.
To measure the quality, we rely only on the adherence to GRI guide-
lines to assess the degree and quality of CSR disclosure. To overcome
such limitation, and as a sensitivity analysis, we provide evidence‐
based upon alternative measure CSR disclosure quantity and quality.
For this purpose, we use Thomson Reuters' environmental, social,
and governance “ESG” score. ESG score represents a company's CSR
performance based on reported data in the public domain.2 “ESG”
score is derived from the scores of 10 performance categories. These
performance categories include use of resources, greenhouse and
other emissions, sustainable innovations, responsible management,
shareholders' relationship management, CSR strategy, workforce‐2Currently, there are several ESG data providers, a summary of each of these
providers is beyond the scope of this paper. Some of the major well‐known
ESG rating agencies are (1) Bloomberg, (2) DowJones Sustainability Index (DJSI),
(3) MSCI ESG Research, (4) Thomson Reuters ESG Research Data, and (5)
RepRisk.related issues, human rights, community development, and product
responsibility. A combination of the scores of 10 performance catego-
ries is weighted proportionately to the count the total score. These
performance categories are compartmented in three main pillar scores
and the final ESG score. This score is widely considered as the repre-
sentation of a company's ESG performance and commitment. The
“ESG” score ranges from 0.1 to 100 based on 10 categories data
points that Thomson Reuters assigns. ESG score is minimum for those
that report a minimum amount of social and environmental data and
the maximum range for those that report every data point.
Building upon this alternative measure of CSR data, Models 2 and
3 are again tested (Model 1 is not regressed because it only examines
the impact of the reporting, without accounting for its quality). Results
are reported in Table 6 that clearly support the previous findings.
Model 2 confirms that the higher availability of information leads to
better financial market response (β1= − 0.016). This better response
is translated into lower difficulties in accessing finances. Moreover,
this effect is even higher when firms externally assured their reports
(β1 = −0.016 + β3= − 0.019 = −0.035) than when assurance is not
available (β1 = −0.016). Meanwhile, results of Model 3 shows that
the lower capital constraints as a result of superior comparability and
availability of CSR information are even greater when assurance is of
greater quality (γ1 = −2.34e−08 + γ3 = −1.92e−09 = −2.532e−08) than
when the quality of assurance is lower (γ1 = −2.34e–08). However,
again, coefficients are not relevant concerning their magnitude, and
thus, there is an extremely low relationship between assurance quality
and access to financial capital for the firms that encourage assurance
for their CSR reports.4.4 | Discussion of results
Overall, our results empirically support the premise of value relevance
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TABLE 5 Multivariate analyses









CSRD −0.081** 0.034 −0.081
CSRD_quality −0.004*** 0.001 −0.005 −1.53e‐08*** 3.2e‐09 −9.12e‐07
Assurance −0.196*** 0.057 −0.196
CSRD_quality * Assurance −0.005*** 0.002 −0.005
AQ −5.08e08*** 1.53e‐08 −6.33e‐07
CSRD_quality * AQ −5.60e−10** 2.48e‐10 −4.18e‐7
Control Variables
Size −0.001* 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.001 −1.87e10** 6.61e−11 −4.01e‐07
Leverage 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 3.08e−08*** 1.45e−09 1.43e‐06
Market_cap 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 9.16e−10*** 1.92e−10 3.84−08
LTD_CE −4.51e−08 7.85‐e08 −4.51e−08 −6.42e−08 8.06e−08 −6.42−‐08 4.78e−12*** 1.70e−12 1.82−07
Loss 0.091 0.159 0.091 0.078 0.162 0.078 ‐ ‐
Number_Analysts 0.009*** 0.003 0.009 0.013*** 0.003 0.013 −6.89e−10 5.30e‐09 ‐1.47e‐08
Capital_expenditures −0.002 0.002 −0.02 −0.004 0.003 −0.004 −3.17e07*** 7.37e08 4.86e‐08




Pr > z = 0.663 Pr > z = 0.591 Pr > z = 0.553
Note. The impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure, quality, and reliability on capital constraints.
Sample 1 (Models 1 and 2): Companies that disclose and do not disclose CSR information: 9,744 observations of 1,137 companies in 2007‐2016.
Sample 2 (Model 3): Companies that disclose CSR information with assurance data: 4,076 observations of 829 companies in 2007‐2016.
*Statistically significant at 90%. **Statistically significant at 95%. ***Statistically significant at 99%.
TABLE 6 Sensitivity analyses
Model 2 Model 3
Coef. SE Elasticities ∂(y)/∂(lnx) Coef. Std. Err. Elasticities ∂(y)/∂(lnx)
Main variables
ESG −0.016*** 0.003 −0.016 −2.34e−08** 1.03e‐08 −2.34e‐08
Assurance −1.227*** 0.408 −1.227
ESG * Assurance −0.019*** 0.006 −0.019
AQ −2.25e−07*** 5.70e−08 −2.25e−07
ESG * AQ −1.92e−09** 7.69e−10 ‐1.92e−09
Control variables
Size −0.001 0.001 −0.000 2.62e−10*** 4.70e−11 2.62e−10
Leverage 0.001 0.001 0.000 3.30e−08*** 2.07e−09 3.30e−08
Market_cap 0.001*** 0.001 0.000 3.65e−09*** 3.18e−10 3.65e−09
LTD_CE −7.57e−08 8.25e−08 −7.57e−08 −1.94e−12 2.33e−12 −1.94e−12
Loss −0.036 0.165 −0.036 ‐ ‐ ‐
Number_Analysts 0.011*** 0.003 0.011 2.60e−08*** 4.70e−09 2.60e−08
Capital_expenditures 0.001 0.002 0.001 −8.94e−08 7.22e−08 −8.94e−08
Controlled by year, industry, and country
AR(2) Arellano‐Bond test Pr > z = 0.757 Pr > z = 0.984
Note. The impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure quantity and quality on capital constraints (environmental, social, and governance [ESG]
data).
Sample 1 (Model 2): Companies that disclose and do not disclose CSR information: 9,744 observations of 1,137 companies in 2007‐2016.
Sample 2 (Model 3): Companies that disclose CSR information with assurance data: 4,076 observations of 829 companies in 2007‐2016.
*Statistically significant at 90%. **Statistically significant at 95%. ***Statistically significant at 99%.
GARCÍA‐SÁNCHEZ ET AL. 843
844 GARCÍA‐SÁNCHEZ ET AL.voluntary disclosure of CSR enhances the access to financial
resources. We also find that the quality of this information regarding
credibility measured by external assurance achieves a greater benefit
by decreasing capital constraints to a greater extent.
Our first finding related to the positive assessment of CSR infor-
mation for investors is in line with prior work of Sharma and Fernando
(2008), Dhaliwal et al. (2012), and Hartojo and Jo (2015), CSR
reporting receives a positive attention from the financial market par-
ticipants that resultantly improve the access to finance by better
informing the investors. Our findings are in line with those obtained
by Cheng et al. (2014), who note the lower difficulties in accessing
finance for firms that voluntarily disclose CSR information. Our results
also advance the understanding by complementing results related to
other disclosure characteristics. Healy and Palepu (2001) and Kim
et al. (2014) argue that by turning private into public information,
CSR disclosure reduces information asymmetries, forecast errors, and
information risk that means improved access to financial resources,
that is, lower capital constraints. Our results support the premise that
the CSR disclosure influences stakeholder's perceptions (cf. Cormier &
Magnan, 2014; Luo et al., 2015). But, our second and third major find-
ings suggest that the quality, as well as the assurance of this informa-
tion, is the main determinants, which impact the capital constraints
with better intensity.
On the one hand, we follow the recommendation of Jo and
Harjoto (2014) and examine the quality of information. Additionally,
work of Dhaliwal et al. (2012) motivates our analysis to examine the
fact that the effect of CSR reporting could disappear in the long‐term;
therefore, the better approach is to assess the quality effect. We con-
tribute to this empirical debate about the effects of quantity and qual-
ity of CSR disclosure on better firm performance. Our evidence
documents that the higher quality of information leads to better finan-
cial market response. This better response is translated into lower dif-
ficulties in accessing finances.
Our results support the premise of the strong utility of external
assurance as a valid complementary determinant in decreasing capital
constraints for reporting firms. Our results are in line with the argu-
ment of Hodge et al. (2009) that the assurance benefits CSR reporting
by increasing the credibility of information and improving the confi-
dence in disclosed information. Thus, the better access to finance is
expected when assurance is provided. Although, there are very few
studies available that explicitly provide any evidence about the effect
of assurance on the credibility of CSR reports. Yet most of the previ-
ous studies argue that assurance can improve the confidence of inves-
tors and users of CSR information (Brown‐Liburd & Zamora, 2014;
Mock et al., 2007; Simnett et al., 2009). Our findings support a benefit
of CSR and usefulness of assurance regarding the impact on investors'
confidence and the eventual effect on capital constraints.
One most important and interesting finding we observed is an
insignificant relationship between assurance quality and access to
financial capital for the firms that encourage assurance for their CSR
reports. The possible explanation of the no relationship could be the
lack of expertise and specific knowledge of general investors for
understanding the complex information of assurance reports. In this
regards, Luo et al. (2015) argue that general investors are greatly
dependent upon experts to translate the CSR‐related information intoan understandable version for them. For financial market participants,
the assurance availability in itself is a factor that generates credibility
of the CSR information. Investors positively react to the provision of
external assurance but seem indifferent about the details of assurance
quality. In other words, assurance provision for CSR reports eases
funds attraction for focal firm.
But, the basic reason for this result could be the wide heterogene-
ity in the assurance process. In this respect, Manetti and Becatti
(2009) point out that it is difficult achieving an absolute assurance
given the specific characteristics of the subject matter together with
the inherent limitations of the control systems. Along the same lines,
other authors such as O'Dwyer and Owen (2005) and Kolk and Perego
(2010) noted that there is clear assurance diversity regarding the way
to render the conclusions and the information content. Given its vol-
untary nature, there is no universally accepted assurance standard,
which limits its comparability and makes it difficult for investors to
interpret the content of the assurance statement. The lack of the
abovementioned standard could closely determine the perception of
the credibility and the confidence that can be placed by stakeholders
in the sustainability assurance report.5 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
For a sample of international firms from 2007 to 2016, our findings
reveal the following: First, we document that CSR information eases
the financial access for reporting companies. Second, the quality of
CSR disclosure and its external assurance further strengthen the rela-
tionship between disclosure and access to finance. Third, we are not
able to support that a higher quality of assurance decreases the finan-
cial restrictions of a firm. We conclude that financial market does not
assess assurance quality as a mechanism for increasing investor's con-
fidence in CSR information, but the availability of assurance does.
Based upon the observed results, we advocate that the prevailing
controversy regarding the value relevance of CSR disclosure in the lit-
erature can be solved by studying the CSR and financial outcomes
relationship from a multidimensional perspective. In this sense, we
contribute to the literature in different ways. First, from our analysis
of an international sample, this research exposes that how such
reporting can better achieve the goals of communicating CSR‐related
activities in a way that meet the informational needs of a wide range
of audience in general and investors in particular. In this research,
we analyze the impact on access to finance of CSR information. Value
relevance can be referred to the usefulness of sustainability informa-
tion for financial market participants (Carnevale, Mazzuca, & Venturini,
2012). In line with this definition, we consider sustainability informa-
tion to be value relevant if it improves access to finances for a CSR
reporting firm. In this regard, although there is limited literature avail-
able; this paper extends the literature on the relationship between
quality, quantity, and reliability of CSR disclosure and access to finan-
cial capital (Cheng et al., 2014).
To validate our proposed idea of bundling, we bundle up the
quantity with quality of information and its external validation. The
results show a strong complementarity between these characteristics
of CSR information. This is our second major contribution to extant
GARCÍA‐SÁNCHEZ ET AL. 845literature. The investigation of quality and quantity of CSR disclosure,
as well as the presence of external assurance and the quality of assur-
ance, helps us explain the phenomenon in more detail as compared
with existing studies. We note that firms that are engaged in extensive
reporting of the CSR information in standalone sustainability report
face less difficulty in attracting investors. Besides, the quality of this
reporting and the external verification improve the positive effect of
CSR disclosure on the access to financial resources. Thus, from the
perspective of the CSR disclosure, we contribute by examining not
only the impact of reporting on access to finance but also the disclo-
sure quality and reliability. These aspects of CSR disclosure have been
largely ignored in the existing literature. This study helps to advance
the understanding of the role that the quality of CSR disclosure and
assurance play in producing credible sustainability reports and confi-
dence in the financial market in such reports.
Our third major contribution to the existing literature is the confir-
mation of the effect of assurance on the link between CSR disclosure
and financial market outcomes. We note that the presence, although
not its quality, of assurance, is of great importance for the financial
market participants. Firms can win the trust of investors by devoting
some extra efforts to provide external assurance for their CSR reports.
These fact‐based pieces of evidence can clear up the confusion about
the value relevance of CSR information as well as the economic ben-
efits of providing more reliable sustainability‐related information. In
this regard, we provide novel results regarding the effect of assurance
by showing that the market positively reacts to a firm's CSR commit-
ment represented by the quality and reliability of CSR information.
Thus, our paper extends and further develops the existing research
on CSR assurance (cf. Simnett et al., 2009). Our research can be seen
as an answer to the call of Hasan et al. (2005) for an empirical inves-
tigation about the economic benefits of sustainability disclosure.
As a final contribution, this paper uses state of the art methodol-
ogy by testing simultaneous equations for the panel data of sustain-
ability disclosure. The test was based on the GMM estimator
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which resolves the issue of
endogeneity. In this way, our study is unlike the prior studies, which
have only utilized the descriptive analysis for instance content analysis
or survey (Pflugrath et al., 2011). Our analysis is enriched due to our
focus on the temporal dimension of the data, especially in a period
of great change. Analyzing a range of years instead of a single year
(Hodge et al., 2009) helped us update the period hitherto analyzed
(Mock et al., 2007).
Our results have several implications for managers and future
researcher. First, the results can help boost the confidence of man-
agers on CSR disclosure and assurance. With these practices, manage-
rial decisions not only generate benefits for society and improve
corporate transparency but also reduce capital constraints for
reporting firms. The firms that provide better quality credible CSR
information can attract more investments, have better survival
chances, and face lower cost of financing (Sharfman & Fernando,
2008). Second, for firms, it in their great interest to know the clear
benefits of reporting CSR information with better quality and external
assurance. Our results support that the benefits that can be accrued
for a firm by higher quality CSR information disclosure are greater
than lower quality reporting. Finally, we must be aware of the fact thatCSR disclosure is still voluntary in many countries; the assurance mar-
ket, moreover, is an unregulated market. For these reasons, our results
offer interesting insights for policymakers and regulatory bodies, as
well as governments. More specifically, the governments and market
regulatory actors can help financial market to be efficient by promot-
ing quality aspects of CSR disclosure in a focal economy.
Even though our study contributes towards existing literature, it
suffers from some limitations, and one should thoughtfully interpret
our findings. The first issue is the absence of generalizable and reliable
measures of quality of CSR reporting as well of assurance quality. A
debate is still ongoing to find the best measurement of such con-
structs and items. Despite the fact that the dummy variable of disclo-
sure quantity can be criticized, using an alternative measure of
disclosure based on ESG scores does not yield different results. Thus,
we claim a positive impact of disclosure quantity, quality, and validity
on financial access. We encourage future researchers to use alterna-
tive measures to assess the CSR information quality and assurance
quality rather than relying on a single disclosure measure to draw use-
ful conclusions.
Moreover, although we identified access to finance as an out-
come of CSR disclosure, there could be other potential outcomes that
future studies can examine to enrich the understanding. Finally,
despite our contribution of using an international sample, the relations
proposed are not tested considering the institutional factors and their
implications such as the stakeholder orientation of countries, corpo-
rate governance, cultural values, and/or ownership concentration.
Future studies can benefit from our recommendations and can
advance the literature.
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